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The economic importance of copyright industries in developed market economies has
been well documented. Although less important in developing countries, this is likely to
change with the growing weight of the service sector in these economies and its
importance for their closer integration into the global market economy. This paper
analyses the relationship between the copyright and income generation in the audio-
visual sector, in particular music, and argues that the appropriate copyright
administration is essential in creating the conditions for a viable music industry in
developing countries. However, an effective copyright regime is not, by itself, sufficient
to guarantee a flourishing music industry, and other institutional arrangements will be
needed in countries looking to better exploit their musical resources. 
Music is spiritual. The
music business is not.
Van Morrison
Introduction
The economic importance of copyright industries in developed market economies has been amply
documented, and these are becoming all the more important with the rise of the knowledge-based economy.
1
According to recent estimates, the core copyright industries  in the United States contribute $260 billion
2
dollars to the economy and already generate over $60 billion in foreign exchange earning (Daley, 1999; RIAA,
1999). Although such industries are less significant in developing countries, this is likely to change with the
growing weight of the knowledge-based service sector in these countries and its importance for their closer
integration into the global market economy.- 2 -
For  an excellent discussion of the new approach to technological change and its differences with the standard
3
neo-classical model see David (1992).
The  music industry is one of the fastest growing export sectors of the global service economy
(UNCTAD, 1999). Because it is based on creative expression and related intangible assets, intellectual
property plays a critical role in determining its performance. The export potential of music is already
recognized in some developing countries, such as Brazil and India, in addition to its complementary links
countries) and its role in the promotion of national culture. However, in most developing countries the music
industry remains under-researched with insufficient information or reliable data on its economic performance,
and in many countries policy makers are still reluctant to accord it the status given to more traditional
industries.
Redressing this situation has not been helped by the treatment of copyrights in the economic literature,
subsumed under the more general discussion of technological change (Archibugi, 1992; Bainbridge, 1996).
Although recent efforts to move beyond the conventional neo-classical approach to technological change have
incorporated learning, the tacit dimension of knowledge and a more interactive relation between the producers
and users of technological knowledge – all features of relevance to cultural industries – the focus has
remained on the role of intellectual property in industrial research and development, where patents play a key
role.
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The primary object of this paper is to show that because the production and distribution of audio-visual
products is more closely tied to the creation of rents than is the case with traditional manufacturing products,
specific institutional mechanisms, and in particular the copyright, play an integral role in organizing these
industries. Where the required institutions associated with the copyright are weak or missing, as in most
developing economies, the chances of becoming competitive in this sector are greatly diminished. The paper
examines this organizing role of the copyright with specific reference to the music industry, paying particular
attention to the interplay of legal, technological and economic factors. This further helps to understand the
distinct institutional foundations of a competitive music industry. We conclude that creating a successful
music industry is as much related to institutional capabilities as to the presence of music potential or talent.
The next chapter examines the links between ideas, rents and industrial organization. In particular, it
shows that in industries where ideas are used as a key resource the need to bring together highly specialized
assets and to create very large markets for the product lead to composite quasi rents, whose vulnerability
means distinct institutional structures, including the copyright, are needed to organize an effective industry.
Chapter II describes these structures in the global music industry. Chapter III looks at the links between
copyrights and income generation in the music industry. In light of weak copyright regimes in many
developing countries, the final chapter examines how copyright regimes have evolved as well as some of their
institutional features, in particular the important role of collecting societies.- 3 -
For discussions of these problems see Baumol et al. (1989), and Rowthorn (1992, 1999).
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This  characteristic is usually referred to as the “expansible” or “non-rival” aspect of a public good. A true
5
public good is also non-excludable.
Romer (1992) unduly downplays this aspect of ideas in his discussion.
6
I.   TALENT, RENTS AND COMPETITION
The 1990s have witnessed the arrival of a more liberal global trading environment and a shift towards
a new technological paradigm based on widespread diffusion of information and digital technologies. These
developments coincide with ongoing structural changes in the developed market economies, particularly the
steady rise of the service economy. Together these trends point to a much more important role for ideas and
other intangible resources in underpinning competitive processes in today’s globalizing world. Assessment
of that role is complicated by long-standing conceptual and measurement problems surrounding the size and
contribution of service activities in a market economy,  as well as by significant differences among these
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activities. But it is made all the more difficult by the peculiar economic nature of ideas.
The fact that an idea can be consumed jointly and that its production often involves significant fixed
costs means that it has some of the qualities of a public good.   However, unlike a public good, it is possible
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for the creator of an idea to exclude others from using it, opening the possibility for wider commercial
exploitation. Property rights for ideas must, as Romer (1992: 71) noted, mean a market price higher than its
marginal cost (which tends to zero) giving rise to rents. At the same time, because the value of non-rival
goods depends on the size of their market, there is an incessant drive to expand the market for ideas so as
to realize greater rents. However, the larger the market for a particular idea, the greater the threat from
copying; and the more so, the lower the marginal cost of reproducing and distributing the idea.
This dilemma is particularly apparent with cultural ideas expressed in a tangible product, such as a
sound recording, a book or a film. Such ideas tend to have a shorter product cycle than other ideas, and
explosive market growth is often the key to successful rent creation. Specific investments made i n
establishing a particular artist and promoting their ideas underpin such growth. At the same time, because
these ideas can often be easily and cheaply reproduced by others, the originator of the idea can be highly
vulnerable to copying, which can prevent a return on investment sufficient to cover fixed costs and to
compensate for the high degree of market uncertainty (Landes and Posner, 1989). Organizing an industry
around effective responses to this dilemma is complicated by the externality problems arising from the
intangible nature of ideas.  Given that the value of an idea (whether as an input into production or as a final
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product) is difficult to gauge without first looking at or hearing it but that disclosure can mean giving
everything away, there are likely to be significant problems of information uncertainty and coordination.
Thus, finding ways to establish and defend a reputation for creativity (without giving away specific ideas)
is likely to be an important concern of cultural producers. At the same time, creating cultural ideas means- 4 -
In  the  case of the music industry, pioneering work from a transaction cost perspective has been undertaken
7
by Ruth Towse.
constant borrowing from and experimenting with existing ideas, allowing that this has to be part of the
creative environment in which cultural ideas can flourish.
In  the presence of joint consumption and (imperfect) excludability, scale economies and non-
competitive pricing, along with considerable risks and uncertainty, are likely to be characteristic features of
cultural industries. As a consequence, distinct institutional structures, including those relating to the
copyright, play a pivotal role in shaping the performance of these industries. In part, such structures arise
out of the need to reduce transaction costs, which can be particularly high when intangible resources are
used extensively.  But it is the central importance of rents – never occupying a comfortable place in
7
conventional economic analysis – which is the key to understanding the structure and dynamics of audio-
visual industries.
The earliest discussions of rent concentrated on payments arising from the unique qualities of land.
Ricardo demonstrated that because the supply of land was invariant to its price, differential rents would be
earned on lands of varying quality, depending on the overall demand for agricultural products and the quality
of the land employed to satisfy that demand (Ricardo, 1981). However, a rent could be earned even on land
of equal quality due to specific attributes that augment its value over the next most valued use. In the case
of land, location could give rise to such scarcity rents. But classical economists also recognized that a
scarcity rent could arise with other resources:
To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the most decisive mark of what is
called genius or superior talents. The public admiration which attends upon such distinguished abilities
makes always a part of their rewards; a greater or smaller proportion as it is higher or lower in degree
(Smith, 1937: 122–123).
Where the supply of such talent is fixed and the service highly specialized, all earnings would take the form
of a scarcity rent whose size would be contingent on the extent of the market reached by the superior talent.
Subsequently, economists rejected the idea that land was a special factor of production, and the term
quasi-rent was coined to suggest that, while the supply of most resources was invariant to price in the near
term, they were usually augmentable over some longer period (Marshall, 1952). Consequently, while most
resources can earn rents, these are likely to be temporary, competed away as new supplies enter the market.
However, following Smith, Marshall recognized that the properties of indestructibility and non-augmentability
might be more enduring with respect to the supply of talent:
When an artisan or a professional man has exceptional natural abilities, which are not made by human
effort, and are not the result of sacrifices undergone for a future gain, they enable him to obtain a surplus
income over what ordinary persons could expect from similar exertions following on similar investments
of capital and labour in their education and start in life; a surplus which is of the nature of a rent
(Marshall, 1952: 517).- 5 -
As  Romer (1992: 72) recognizes, as cultural ideas enter the manufacturing stage it is important to distinguish
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between talent and the ideas produced by talent. Although ideas are non-rival and (imperfectly excludable) talent
is a private good, in the sense of being both rival and perfectly excludable. As long as the idea is embodied in  a
performance by its creator, the degree of excludability is high. 
A  good deal  of the recent discussion of audio-visual industries has concentrated on the economics o f
9
performance, and, in particular, on the difference in cost dynamics between the performing arts and more traditional
manufacturing activities. However, many audio-visual products have already acquired the characteristics of mass-
produced goods, whether as written word, moving image, or song. For a survey of this debate see Towse (1997).
While  Marshall had in mind the exceptional abilities of skilled labour and management in traditional
manufacturing activities, in those industries, such as the audio-visual industries, where creative effort is not
simply a complement to labour and capital but actually defines the nature of the product itself, rent creation
is likely to take on a much more central role in shaping economic performance. This is very much the case
where the talent produces a cultural idea.
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Where a cultural idea is provided as a service through a live performance, the problems of joint
consumption and (imperfect) excludability are reasonably easy to manage. The market remains limited and
because reputation is itself established through direct creative expression, the cultural idea can be reasonably
well protected from imitators and the rent earned is fairly secure. But even under these conditions, and
particularly where the creative effort is divided between the creator of the idea and its performer, rent
creation is less a matter of “natural” talent and more one of organizing multi-dimensional resources with a
significant “social” component:
... a singer represents a bundle of services – voice, voice type, stage presence, physical appearance,
musicianship, ability to work with others – and a “talented” singer is the one with the right combination
at the right time. The demand for singers is anyway derived from the demand for particular works and
also depends on current taste or fashion for particular types of performance (Towse, 1992).
Consequently, rent creation in cultural services is likely to be a collective process where the “right
combination” depends on the presence of various complementary skills to bring the best out of a performer.
In their absence, the rent can be significantly diminished. At the same time discontinuities on the demand side
due to changing tastes and fashion are likely to add to the uncertainty surrounding the size of the potential
rent.
The economic status of the cultural idea changes once it can be separated from the individual creator
and embodied in a tangible product, whose manufacture can become the focus of organizational and
technological innovations.  Due to such innovations, the consumption of cultural ideas has been able to
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expand across both time and space. Under these conditions, nurturing and protecting artistic talent is much
more closely tied to the organization and management of a growing market for the product. The advantage
to the talented individual from this increased level of exposure is the potentially higher rents it can generate.
But it carries a cost in terms of a loss of control, both because the reputation of the artist – and the rent
he/she can earn – becomes much more dependent on activities linked to market creation and because the- 6 -
As Landes and Posner (1989: 329–333) discuss in some detail, there are various practical obstacles to copying,
10
even in the absence of copyrights, as well as various non-legal norms against it.
cultural idea acquires the properties of a non-rival product, which opens up the possibility for widespread
copying and imitation.
10
The copyright is one of the essential institutional mechanisms which has helped facilitate the creation
and dissemination of cultural works through modern business enterprises, by providing a framework to
manage the problems arising from the joint consumption and imperfect excludability of such works. As such,
it is much more than a mechanism for protecting the rent derived from an intellectual resource; it is part of
the institutional framework that helps define a marketable product as well as reliable income flows (through
royalties and related income). To fully understand that role it is necessary to recognize that the mass
production of many cultural goods continues to rely on a number of very highly specialized assets and faces
unpredictable and even erratic demand conditions. This implies distinct features in their organization at the
industry level.
Marshall recognized that in certain industries where demand conditions lead to quasi rents and where
the production process relies heavily on combining separately owned specialized assets any rent created
jointly – or what he called a composite quasi-rent – would be well in excess of what each could receive
elsewhere (Marshall, 1952: 520). Although the traditional forces of competition are unlikely to eliminate them
very quickly, if at all, composite quasi-rents are vulnerable and this tends to give rise to a variety of
specialized institutional arrangements to guarantee the most effective use of the specialized assets, and
through this the highest possible rent to the industry. Vulnerability reflects the high degree of risk which
accompanies any production process combining specific assets (Williamson, 1985), the danger of the whole
industry becoming hostage to the demands of one group of specialized suppliers, as well as the damage
arising from conflicts between the different suppliers.
Marshall’s analysis was confined to traditional manufacturing activities, but his concerns are of even
greater relevance in idea-based industries whose products are defined by specific talents. In these industries,
vulnerability arises not only from supply-side problems surrounding asset specificity but also from the
unpredictable role of fashion in shaping market tastes, and because illicit copying and imitation can reduce
the potential size of the market. As firms in these industries depend on creating large markets and on sizeable
investments in specific capital goods and knowledge-based assets, such high levels of vulnerability are likely
to give rise to a variety of non-market institutional arrangements to guarantee their economic viability and
success.
The copyright system, in addition to creating a market, can, by promoting a common interest in the
effective commercial exploitation of cultural ideas, help reduce conflicts between different asset owners and
share some of the risks arising from a volatile market. However, copyrights are not the only way to promote
and protect composite quasi-rents. Another mechanism discussed by Marshall was the geographical
clustering of these industries – industrial districts – which would allow relations of trust to develop among
specialized suppliers, guarantee more regular employment of specialized assets, and ensure that knowledge- 7 -
See  Kozul (1995) for a discussion of the furniture industry, where design is a key factor. See Storper and
11
Sorenson (1987) on the film industry, as well as the discussion in Krugman (1994).
Over 60 per cent of music performance revenues are derived from these sources (Vogel, 1998: 41).
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spillovers be maximized to the benefit of the industry as a whole (Marshall, 1919). A number of studies have
found such districts in industries where ideas are an integral component of the production process.
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The presence of scale economies and non-competitive pricing, as well as the need for copyrighting and
clustering, has implications for the optimal degree of competition in idea-based industries. Although the
copyright protects a scarcity rent, it is only one amongst various mechanisms designed to support rent
creation in industries which rely on talent and ideas as their basic resources. The design of government
policies, including appropriate forms of regulation, for industries where knowledge is a key resource will have
to be sensitive to the role of rents as a driving force of economic success, the high degrees of risk facing
agents in the industry, and the specific institutions which the combination of rents and uncertainty generate.
II.   THE GLOBAL MUSIC INDUSTRY
Music is a quintessential copyright industry based on creative talent and highly specialized assets.
Although  the modern music industry has its roots in the early twentieth century, when technological
breakthroughs in recording meant that reproduction rather than live performance became the basis of the
industry, its present shape owes much to the rising incomes and personal experimentation of the post-war
golden age, and in particular the growing financial independence of young people. In the late 1950s the
industry was still relatively small and dominated by the United States market, where sales had reached $500
million. By 1998 over 4 billion records (any sound recording in various formats, including tapes, records,
CDs, DATs, etc.) were sold worldwide, generating a total revenue of nearly $39 billion. A further $5 billion
was generated from pirated recordings. Moreover, music has become increasingly tied to other entertainment
products, such as TV, films and videos, thus generating further revenue streams.
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The global music market is dominated by Europe and North America, each accounting for around one
third of total music sales. Asia – dominated by the Japanese market – accounts for a little under a quarter of
the global sales of recorded music. The fastest growing markets, however, are located in the developing
world. The Latin American market grew by 8 per cent per annum over the past decade, and is expected to
exceed 10 per cent growth over the next five years. Although still a small market (with total sales of only
$233 million in 1997), strong growth is also projected for the African market.
Historically,  the industry has been subject to considerable volatility. On the demand side, the
unpredictable (and on some accounts uninformed) nature of the consumer means that non-price factors such
as fashionability, herd behaviour, and experimentation have had a profound influence on the music market.
Adapting to and channelling these influences has become a major focus of the leading firms in the music- 8 -
industry and an increasingly dominant influence on investment strategies. On the supply side, technological
developments have not only allowed better and cheaper ways of delivering music to the consumer but have
also generated new products to enter the market. Such developments have, periodically, allowed independent
firms to enter an industry which, otherwise, tends towards high levels of concentration through large
vertically integrated firms (Fink, 1989).
Since the mid-1960s, and accelerating in the 1980s, the industry has tended to become steadily more
concentrated (Alexander, 1994) under the dominance of a small number of very large international firms.
Currently it is estimated that approximately 75 per cent of the global market is controlled by five media giants
(BMG, EMI Music, Polygram, WEA Group, and Sony Music) (RIAA, 1998). Most of these corporations are
highly diversified media conglomerates, in which music revenues account for between 10 per cent (Sony)
and 33 per cent (BMG) of global revenues. Only EMI, the smallest of the “majors”, remains primarily focused
on music.
Through various oligopolistic practices these firms are able to earn the large rents needed to maintain
their leadership role in the industry, and to generate the considerable financial resources which allow them
to carry the risks and costs involved in identifying and developing artistic talent and marketing a risky final
product with very large sunk costs. According to Towse (1999: 279), an album released by a major record
company costs anywhere from £250,000 to £1.75 million, of which £125,000–£1.4 million is recoupable
from artists royalties if sales are high enough; however, on average only 10 per cent of recordings actually
cover costs (Vogel, 1998: 147).
But despite the financial dominance of the majors, the industry still contains a galaxy of smaller
independent firms characterized by an enormous heterogeneity and offering a diverse range of services and
products. Independent record companies have been able to survive often by specializing in market niches
(classical, R&B, country’&’western, jazz) although increasingly these companies have only been able to
continue by establishing “alliances” with the majors. There also exists a highly complex system o f
subcontracting on the production side among firms of different sizes. Most recording studios are independent
and many producers subcontract their services to the majors. The presence of independent companies,
particularly at the interface with artists, is probably a reflection of the limits of large firms with respect to
creativity and experimentation, which remain essential ingredients of a flourishing music sector. 
This continued role for large numbers of highly specialized firms explains the geographical clustering
of the music business in a small number of key centres, for example Lagos, London, Los Angeles, Miami,
Nashville, Paris and Rio de Janeiro. The reasons for this reflect the professional advantages that songwriters
and musicians themselves can derive from being part of a closely knit community of talent. But, at the
industry level it also reflects the need for a readily available supply of specific assets and the advantages from
having close communication where relations of trust have to be established, e.g. between artist and producer
(Fink, 1989: 58). Even for the largest companies, the presence of music centres such as London, Los
Angeles and New York allow for close links to and familiarity with financial markets enabling a degree of- 9 -
In a recent article in the New York Times (“I Hate World Music”, 3 October 1999), David Byrne – formally the
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lead singer with Talking Heads and now a record producer – whose label carries a number of artists from developing
countries, has offered a caustic critique of the term “world music”.
intimacy to develop between creditor and borrower, which is necessary when large but inherently risky
investment projects are involved.
Despite the financial leverage of the majors, technological shocks continue to shape the industry. Owing
to the impact of new digital technologies – especially Internet technologies that enable direct downloading
of music – distribution costs will be reduced substantially, thus allowing new entrants. These trends are likely
to fundamentally alter the economics of the entire industry. Industry analysts predict that 7.5 per cent of the
overall music market will be distributed online by the year 2002, up to one third within the decade (Jupiter
Communications, 17 June 1998, and Financial Times, 12 December 1998), and up to 10 per cent by 2005.
Industry analysts predict that in five years global Internet music sales will reach $4 billion, i.e. 8 per cent of
the market (Financial Times, 26 May 1999).
These latest technological developments in the industry threaten to change the balance of power within
the music market, thereby allowing consumers worldwide direct access to their favourite artists at discounted
prices. Consumers will be able to entirely bypass traditional retailers, with significant implications for the cost
structure and configuration of the present industry. The five major music companies are extremely concerned
about the latest developments in entertainment technologies and are already preparing themselves for
Internet’s full impact (Andersen and Howells, 1999).
Developing countries and the music industry
Arguably, many developing countries are better positioned to compete in audio-visual industries than
in many traditional industries. This is because the basic raw material, such as talent to create new music, is
readily available and entry costs, at least in the case of music, are not as prohibitive as in many industries.
In addition, and despite the global image of the music industry, there remains a very strong regional
dimension to musical tastes. In 1998, 65 per cent of global music sales originated from a “local” source,
ranging from 40 per cent in Europe to over 85 per cent in the United States. This regionalization of musical
tastes points to potential markets for fledgling industries in developing countries. Moreover, as relative
newcomers, developing countries may have the most to gain from new technologies such as the Internet.
However, developing countries have, for the most part, been unable to successfully commercialize their own
music, and hence reap equitable benefit from this important indigenous resource.
A great deal of so-called “world music”, based on folk music heritage, originates with musicians from
the developing world.  This type of music has wide “cross-over potential” and appeal and, although its
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overall market share is very small (under 2 per cent of global market share – IFPI, 1998), the share is
growing. The cross-over potential derives from its mixture with diverse musical genres, such as soul, rap,- 10 -
The first third-world artists to successfully cross over were, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Mexican jazz-
14
rock guitarist Carlos Santana and the Jamaican reggae musician Bob Marley.
R&B, jazz, rock and pop, which can have vast appeal to global audiences.   That it is not generally well
14
known  in developed market economies is largely owing to poor marketing and commercialization.
Notwithstanding, developing countries, such as Brazil (the world’s sixth largest exporter of recorded music),
already have some competitive advantages in the creation of music and generation of new musical sounds
based on the fusion of traditional music with “western” musical traditions.
As shown in table 1, trade in this sector is growing strongly. Over the past decade, trade flows in
recorded music products between developed and developing countries have shown a significant increase,
growing more quickly than global trade. However, there have been clear asymmetries. Not only does trade
continue to be dominated by Northern producers, but although imports from the developing countries in the
developed market economies have risen fivefold, exports of recorded music by the developed to the
developing countries have grown by almost sixfold. These trends have only intensified since 1997. Thus,
while developing countries are becoming more important both as producers of and markets for music
products, there is clearly an urgent need to strengthen the export potential of this sector and overcome large
and rising trade deficits.
Table 1
Music and trade, 1988–1997
A.  Developed market economy (DMEC) exports of recorded music
(Sitc Rev. 2 Heading 89832. In thousands of US dollars)
Partner 1988 1997
DMEC:  World 3,943,505 13,342,635
DMEC:  DMEC 3,360,896 11,135,601
DMEC:  Developing world 326,418 1,859,258
B.  Developed market economy imports of recorded music
(Sitc Rev.2 Heading 89832. In thousands of US dollars)
Partner 1988 1997
DMEC:  World 4,300,382 12,454,049
DMEC:  DMEC 4,151,389 11,676,323
DMEC:  Developing world 133,593 684,663
Source: UN Comtrade Database, various years.- 11 -
However,  unlike literary compositions, accidental copying may infringe upon a song writer’s copyright if the
15
song has been widely performed (Landes and Posner, 1989: 34–67).
Although  copyright offices around the world do not use as explicit a classification in copyright registration
16
as in the United States, it appears that most mature economies implicitly rely on a similar deconstruction with respect
to  copyright legislation of neighbouring music rights, as well as the way in which they manage and process the
neighbouring copyrights in musical works (see chapter IV on the role of royalty-collecting societies). The U S
classification scheme can be found at website: http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/reg.html (November 1999).
The pattern of trade is not altogether surprising. Developing countries do not have the large firms and
financial structures necessary to invest significant capital into a sophisticated marketing and distribution
machinery with a global reach. This is unlikely to change very quickly. However, the local music industry
in most developing countries has suffered from weak institutional and political support, low levels of
entrepreneurial capability, low value-added, over-dependence on foreign manufacturing and distribution, and
massive copyright infringement. Hence the earnings are far below the potential, were the industry more
effectively organized.
As is apparent from the discussion in the previous chapter, the organization of the industry is complex.
However, an appropriate point from which to set about reversing the situation in developing countries is with
an examination of the way income is generated and managed in the music industry, and the important role
that copyright legislation and institutions play in this.
III.   COPYRIGHTS AND MUSIC REVENUES
Rents in the music industry are generated through the creation of musical ideas with the help of highly
specialized assets and market expansion. Much like other intellectual property rights, by establishing rules of
access to musical ideas the copyright is essential to this process of rent creation. However, unlike other
intellectual property rights, the copyright does not protect the artistic idea itself, only the expression of the
idea in fixed form – i.e. rock’n’roll music (a certain beat, instrumental sound, etc.) cannot be protected, but
its particular expression by, say, the Rolling Stones can. Moreover, unlike patents, the copyright is not issued
but simply asserted by the author or publisher. In part, these weaker aspects of property rights reflect the
greater extent to which a legitimate level of borrowing is an essential part of a creative artistic culture.   But
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unlike industrial innovations, where an initial rent can be earned by the inventor through ensuring secrecy and
charging a very high price for the product which embodies the innovation even at the expense of market size,
the songwriter has an interest from the outset in establishing as large a market as possible.
The process of income generation in the music industry begins with the intangible musical composition.
Within music two principal types of “ideas” are produced: musical compositions and sound recordings:
16
• A  musical composition consists of music, including any accompanying words, and is normally
registered in Class PA (performing art). The author of a musical composition is generally the composer,- 12 -
What  is copyrightable is not straight-forward:  “In specifying the criteria of copyrightability, the designers
17
of any copyright system must select a position somewhere on the spectrum marked by what is ‘original’ and what
is a recognizable combination of the existing. Such judgement has become even harder with information technology
making  it possible to merge and change existing compositions, so what is new becomes debatable (the same
problems  apply to copyrights in software). Another ambiguity is that copyright law does not require any proven
artistic merit o r novelty (as patent law) and accepts authorship on the basis of creative effort; thus arrangements,
compilations, listings, databases, etc., are protected by copyrights separately from the original material embodied
in them” (Cheung, 1986: 6).
and the lyricist, if any. A musical composition may be in the form of a notated copy (for example, sheet
music) or in the form of a phono-record (for example, cassette tape, LP or CD).
• A sound recording results from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other sounds, and is
always registered in Class SR (sound recording). The author of a sound recording is the performer,
whose performance is fixed, or the record producer, who processes the sounds and fixes them in the
final recording, or both (USCO, 1998).
Once codified into a notated sheet or a phono-record, a musical composition becomes “copyrightable”,
provided it meets certain conditions of eligibility, such as “originality” and sufficient “creative effort”.  A
17
musical composition in the form of a phono-record does not necessarily mean that there is a claim to a
copyright in the sound recording, nor is a copyright in a sound recording the same as, or a substitute for,
a copyright in the underlying musical composition. These musical ideas and the associated division of labour
among its authors or creators are presented in table 2.
The copyright belongs initially to the author or creator of the first fixation who controls any subsequent
reproduction, distribution or public performance of the work. However, once a music composition has been
recorded and issued to the public, any one may (by virtue of the compulsory licensing provisions of
copyright law in most economies) make a recording of the composition and release it for sale, provided that
the prescribed royalty is paid to the original author, the author is credited, and there is no unauthorized
adaptation of the original composition.
The initial focus of music copyright was sheet music and live performance. However, owing to the
development of techniques in music creation, recording and delivery, some neighbouring copyrights have
been issued. That is, as (i) new sound recording and music playing technologies (e.g. magnetic tapes, long-
play (LPs) vinyl records, compact desks (CDs), high fidelity and stereos, video, digital audio technology),
and (ii) new broadcasting and public performance techniques (e.g. radio, television, cable, satellite, Internet)
have evolved, the musical copyright, which was originally designed to protect printed copies of musical
compositions (i.e. music sheets), has likewise expanded to include mechanical rights (i.e. the right to
reproduce musical works in sound recordings) and synchronization rights (i.e. the right to record music that
is timed to the display of visual images in films or videotape soundtracks), in addition to a much broader
concept of performance rights (to include the right to receive payment for almost any broadcast and public
performance of a composition). These neighbouring copyrights provide the basis for collecting various types
of royalties and licence fees (table 3).- 13 -
Table 2
Deconstructing musical ideas for copyrights
Music idea Classification Division of “music creators” Physical objects in which
of right (or authors for copyright the music work can be
purpose) fixed
 a  b
Musical Performing art (PA) • The composer • Notated copy (music
composition • The lyricist sheet)
• Phono-record (tape,
cassette tape, disk  –
LP or CD, etc.)
Sound recording Sound recording • The performer (or • Phono-record (tape,
(SR) recording artist) cassette tape, disk –
• The record producer (or LP or CD, etc.)
publisher)
• Or both
Source: Andersen and Miles (1999).
a Composer, lyricist, performer (or recording artist) and record producer (or publisher) are not necessarily
different people.
b The physical objects are not musical compositions or sound recordings, but just various ways in which
various kinds of music works can be fixed.
Although, the author/owner of a copyright has the exclusive control over a bundle of rights (such as the
right to perform, reproduce and distribute the copyright work), these rights (either separately or together)
may be transferred or licensed to another party. In the case of a musical composition, it is common for the
author of the original composition to transfer ownership to a publisher, while the owner of a sound recording
usually transfers ownership to a record company, which then owns the recording rights. As was suggested
earlier, and in comparison with most industrial innovations, a key step in the creation of a music industry is
the release of the copyright by the original creator all the way down the music supply chain and across the
various broadcast media. With the copyright secured, a producer can commit himself to the complex and
expensive process of organizing artists, producers, sound engineers, sessions musicians, etc., and record
companies can begin marketing an often risky product, with a guarantee that their high fixed cost investment
is protected against free-riding.  The artist is guaranteed future income flows based on the popularity of- 14 -
The  artist is also guaranteed income for past works, which can be important if the reputation of an artist
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suddenly changes for the better and earlier recordings increase in demand.
Table 3
Music licences in the United States
Type of music use Type of licence required
1. Commercial broadcast of nondramatic music Performance licence
2. Non-broadcast performance of nondramatic Performance licence
music
3. Phono-record sold for private use Compulsory or “negotiated” mechanical licence
4. Music video production used for broadcastor Synchronization licence and performance licence
cable TV
5. Movie, music video other video software sold Synchronization licence that includes licence to
or rented to individuals for home use mechanically reproduce copies for sale
6. Motions picture for theatrical exhibition Synchronization licence that includes a right to
7. Broadcast commercial Special use permit
8. Merchandizing tie-ins, computer software Special use permit
applications, etc.
9. Environmental music (e.g. Muzak) Transcription licence that includes the right of
10. Dramatico-musical production (performed Grand right or dramatic right
live)
11. Public broadcasting station Negotiated licence
12. Jukebox Negotiated licence




Source: Baskerville (1995, table 6.1).
his/her composition.   Consequently, the copyright in music represents a complex case of joint ownership,
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between the author (and the composer), the publisher, the record company and other entities involved in the
commercialization of the music product.
While this arrangement opens the possibility to maximize rents, problems can arise from the fact that these
benefits are not necessarily shared evenly. It is interesting to see how the transaction, and hence location,- 15 -
The  UK Performance Right Society also cross-subsidizes between copyright holders for mainly technical
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reasons with respect to the operation of the service they provide. This is due to lack of adequate direct and indirect
administration cost allocation procedures, as well as because of less than 100 per cent logging of performances,
which disfavours small and not so well-known musical works (MMC, 1996: 104–107).
of copyrights and royalties (which is the main revenue for the music industry) is determined by the
bargaining power and collaboration of individuals and firms, including lobbying and statutory intervention,
as opposed to market forces. Towse (1999) and Kretschmer et al. (1999) have illustrated how different
incentives and interests as well as asymmetry in information and risk evolves into skewed power structures
between composers, musicians, artists, publishers and record companies, when they negotiate modes of
royalty sharing or payment.
Whereas a combination of bargaining power and collaboration (networks and relationships) between
agents and firms, together with scale economies, helps to reduce the uncertainty surrounding income in the
music industry, it certainly does not reduce the variation in income determined by accumulated rent from
sales and performances (MMC, 1996: 57). Valuation of the various music rights is made all the more difficult
by the realization that across much of the music industry talent (in music supply) and taste (in music
demand) is socially determined (e.g. based upon social political attitude or fashion). Hence, rents and incomes
related to musical ideas can and do change abruptly over time. In part because of this, cross-subsidies are
operated between copyright holders or controllers, and the bodies responsible for collecting and distributing
royalties have a redistributive role. This is motivated by attempts to support specific categories (such as, for
example, classical and other minority music with “cultural importance”, or music used for educational
purposes), as well as by attempts to redress perceived imbalances in income.
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It is not merely the allocation of royalties which is based on bargaining and collaboration among various
individuals and firms in the music supply chain; the “size” of the royalties paid by music users is also based
on a complex system of tariffs and licensing agreements, which reflect similar pressures. However, there
is no common standard within or across countries, even in the most mature economies where negotiations
with music users tend to be carried out by the collecting agencies (see chapter IV below). For example, the
Performance Right Society (PRS) in the United Kingdom (now allied with the Mechanical Copyright
Protection Society – MCPS) negotiates licences on an individual basis with broadcasters, but for other users
a tariff structure is applied. Some tariffs are set by the PRS, some are agreed through trade associations, and,
finally, some are subject to agreements established by the Copyright Tribunal of the United Kingdom; finally,
the PRS has “special arrangements” for some music users (MMC, 1996: 71–74).
IV.   ORCHESTRATING COPYRIGHTS IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
The broad aim of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) is to provide incentives which both encourage
creativity and disseminate the products of that creativity. These rights span a diverse range of subjects,- 16 -
The  piracy problem arises from the combination of high fixed production costs of production of music
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expression, compared with the very low marginal costs of making copies.
See, for example, Kretschmer et al. (1999). For the philosophy of IPR systems, see below.
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disciplines and legal regimes, and involve different types of legal statute such as property, contract and
competition law; they also touch on a wide spectrum of economic and social issues relating, for example,
to trade, monopoly and competition, and cultural identity. Musical copyrights are no exception to this
complexity. But in addition, the use of copyrights to organize creativity in the music industry must
accommodate the industry’s incessant drive for rapid market expansion and allow for borrowing and mixing
ideas, which is essential for a creative music scene.
Perhaps not surprisingly, music copyrights provide imperfect protection to the industry. There has long
been a substantial leak in the copyright system, with illegal copying on cassette tapes and now CDs (as CD
writers become more common),  and this has become big business, and in some regions of the world part
20
of organized crime. Today one out in three recordings sold in the world is based on piracy (BPI, 1998).
Despite this, whether and how much income is generated from this particular resource still depends on the
efficacy of the “copyright regime” and the related royalty-collecting administration machinery. 
A. The evolution and efficiency of copyright legislation
Copyright legislation in music, and its enforcement, has not been strategically planned but has been shaped
by a persistent search to strike the right balance between copyright owners and users – a balance which has
been subject to a variety of technological and economic, as well as legal, pressures. The first copyright court
case relating to music was held in the United Kingdom in 1777, involving Johann Christian Bach and
concerning publishers’ rights. It was 70 years later, in 1847, that performing rights were established, when
two composers Paul Henrion and Victor Parziot, supported by their publisher Ernest Bourget, brought a
lawsuit against a café in Paris whose orchestra was performing their songs. Whereas court cases in the early
days were based upon establishing a basic framework to protect “authors” with respect to publishing and
performing rights, the more recent court cases have centred on whether exploitation of the rights of music
composers by multinational firms (especially the record companies) undermine the moral and long-run
economic intention of the IPR system to protect creativity.   The best known court case in this respect is
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probably the “artist George Michael versus Scene”, which was lost by the artist in 1994 in the High Court
of the United Kingdom. However, as the number of music producers and users (both public and private) has
multiplied, the search for a legal balance and the fairness of copyrights has grown in complexity. Not
surprisingly, music copyright law is full of annexes around references to software and related broadcasting
media. Most recently this has centred on digital music composition and recordings, where the music industry- 17 -
Galperin  (1999) discusses the problem of how many cultural industries in general are based on annexes,
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exceptions and side-agreements with respect to trade related aspects (see also footnote 25).
However, the United States (i.e. world’s biggest exporter of cultural products – films, TV and recorded music)
23
has not signed the Rome Convention.
The  TRIPs Agreement was signed by more than 100 States in 1994 as a part of the Uruguay Round on the
24
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The main provisions of the TRIPs Agreement include: (i) basic
principles:  a minimum standard for intellectual property (IP) protection is established; national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment are provided; (ii) protection standards for industrial property rights (patents), copyrights,
etc.; (iii) IP enforcement; (iv) dispute settlement related to IPRs; and (v) transitional measures: the TRIPs Agreement
is expected to be implemented between 1996 and 2006, depending on a country’s level of development.
faces the same types of copyright problems as the protection of computer programmes. In most countries,
these have been dealt with as a literary work, to which annexes have been added (Bainbridge, 1996: 175).
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Because ideas can cross borders more easily than physical goods, copyrights were embodied i n
international legal treaties from a fairly early date. The first such treaty dates back to the Berne International
Copyright Convention in 1886, which recognized the scope for enforcement of publishing rights across
countries, and enforced a so-called “principle of national treatment”, which extended protection to a minimum
number of years after the creator’s death. Rather than harmonizing national legislations, it was required that
each member country give the same protection to the works of creators in member countries published
within the country as they do to creators of their own country. This principle of national treatment today
applies to the member countries of the Rome Convention (1961) with respect to performing, mechanical and
synchronization rights in relation to sound recordings (in the absence of other reciprocal agreements).
23
Agreements on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) came into force in 1995 as a part of the
Uruguay Round Agreement. By the time all signatories are in full compliance, each is expected to have a
system of IPR and effective enforcement consistent with internationally agreed norms and standards.
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The evolution of copyright legislation has been closely linked to technological changes in the audio-visual
sector and to the rise of corporate capitalism during the early decades of the twentieth century (Noble, 1979;
Sullivan, 1989). Although the music industry did not take off until after 1945, it was, from an early date,
subject to the influence of large, vertically integrated, firms and to conflicts among the different parties
involved  in producing and distributing the final music product. In part to combat growing corporate
influence, musicians created during the first decades of the twentieth century a number of institutions of their
own, including collecting agencies, which could defend their interests.
The rise of radio in the United States during the inter-war period provided an initial point of conflict over
copyrights in the modern music industry, when the owners of stations insisted that their purchase of a record
carried no further financial obligations to composers. This situation was not finally resolved (in favour of the
composers) until the early 1940s (Vogel, 1998: 133). Improvements in recording technology and the public
airing of singles through the jukebox provided another set of contentious issues after the war. The
introduction of cassette tapes in the 1970s provided another cause of conflict between owners and users of
music goods; as music-related copyrights have become increasingly science-based in both sound recording- 18 -
In  June  1974 the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) convened a n
25
advisory group of experts that looked into the question of the protection of computer programmes; it found that i n
only a  few countries might computer software be adequately protected without changes to existing laws (WIPO,
1987: 21). Even in developed countries – such as the United Kingdom, where protection afforded to computer
programmes is considered relatively good – was this done by treating computer programmes as literary works under
the Copyright Act of 1956. Indeed, even under the subsequent Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, in the
United Kingdom , as in most countries, computer programmes are still treated as literary works (Bainbridge, 1996:
175). All other types of related protections are via annexes to copyright law.
and channels of music delivery using digital technologies (including software and Internet), the application
of copyrights to protect these technological advances has become relevant to music products.   The income
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leaks through copying, already substantial, are threatening to become floods on the information
superhighway; therefore, new ways to make the Internet organized and secure in order to recognize and
monitor intellectual and other property are currently being investigated (Kokka, 1998). Thus, not only does
the new information paradigm indicate the greater need for copyright protection, but the copyright system
also needs to undergo changes to satisfy more effectively the new technological opportunities being provided
within the new information economy (Andersen and Howells, 1998).
B. The diversity of copyright regimes
National IPR Offices are responsible for developing and carrying out policy on all aspects of intellectual
property, including copyrights. This essentially means defining the broad “rules of the game” through
establishing the fairness and equity of copyright legislation, including setting and adjusting royalty rates, as
well as determining the public interest in the availability of creative works. The Directorates of these Offices
are also normally responsible for formulating and implementing new legislation, which includes any changes
necessary to meet obligations under international directives and international treaties. Furthermore, the Offices
and Directorates play an active part in international negotiations. Table 4 provides examples of where the IPR
system in relation to copyright is administered by national governments in major industrialized economies as
well as in some developing countries.
These regimes must balance the conflicting demands of the creative forces of the music industry,
the desirability of increased information and spillover, which facilitates development and sharing of ideas and
expressions, and the moral integrity of cultural producers. Although all these ingredients must be managed
in an effective copyright regimes, it would appear that the different locations of copyright administration in
the case of music legislation, is, in part, based upon different approaches to intellectual property.
Administering music copyrights under the Library of Congress in the United States and under the Ministry
of  Information in Saudi Arabia suggests an overall rationale on balancing the conflicts surrounding
information spillovers. It also strongly implies that the economic organization of the copyright is left in private
hands. Much the same rationale lies behind locating copyright administration under the Ministry or Secretariat- 19 -
Table 4
Government departments and units under which copyrights are administered
United States United Kingdom Germany France
Government Library of Department of Federal Ministry Ministry of Culture
department  Congress Trade and of Justice  and Francophone
Industry Affairs
Unit Copyright Office The Patent Copyright Section Office of Literacy
Office, and Artistic Property
Copyright
Directorate
Japan Brazil Mexico India
Government Ministry of  Ministry of Secretariat of Ministry of Human
department  Education, Culture Public Education Resource
Science, Sports Development
and Culture
Unit Japanese Copyright National Institute Department of
Copyright Office Coordination of Copyright Education
(JCO) 
Jamaica Cuba Saudi Arabia Trinidad and
Tobago
Government Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of
department Commerce and Legal Affairs Culture Information
Technology
Unit Copyright Unit Intellectual National Directorate of
Property Office Copyright Centre Publications
(CENDA)
South Africa Malawi Denmark Sweden
Government Department of Ministry of Ministry of Ministry of Justice
department Trade and Youth, Sports Culture
Industry and Culture
Unit Office of the Copyright Copyright Division of
Registrar of Society of Division Intellectual Property
Patents, Trade Malawi and Transportation
Marks, Designs (COSOMA)
and Copyright
Source: Information is traced from WIPO (1999).- 20 -
For classification of the rationales or the philosophy of IPR systems see Andersen and Howells (1998).
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of Public Education or the Ministry of Human Resource Development, as is the case in India, Japan and
Mexico. However, this also suggests the need for a public role in organizing creativity, with emphasis on
strengthening human capital. In Jamaica, South Africa and the United Kingdom locating copyright
administration under Departments of Trade and Industry suggests a more strategic approach to copyrights
in creating a dynamic environment. In particular, the need to encourage investment in copyright industries
focuses on incentive problems where fixed costs are high and reproduction costs are low, and the possibility
of direct public support.
By contrast, in Germany, Sweden, and Trinidad and Tobago music copyrights are administered by the
Department of Justice or Ministry of Legal Affairs, which suggests a rationale based on legal rights to own
creativity but a weaker concern with its economic rationale. Finally, in most other countries presented in table
4, music copyrights are administered by the Department of Culture or associated bodies, which reflects a
strong historical and moral rationale for the protection of intellectual creativity, arguable above narrow
economic interests. Such a moral rationale of copyrights is especially based on “human rights”, where the
law should provide remedies against those who appropriate the ideas of others. But another moral rationale
to copyrights is based on “business ethics”, where property rights function as a safeguard for consumers
on matters of product reliability and quality, as well as against deception in the market place.
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It is interesting to see how countries from the same regions with some degree of cultural convergence
(e.g. the Caribbean, Scandinavia, or Central Europe) have no common philosophy on IPRs. However, some
more general patterns can be discerned. In most English-speaking countries the IPR system falls under
common law, and as such is more about protecting the skill, labour and investment of those responsible for
the creation of works, in order to safeguard them from reproduction and other unauthorized uses; whereas
the “droit d’auteur” under the civil law system, which exists in most non-English-speaking countries, results
from considerations of natural justice and regards the work as an expression of the artist’s personality, as
a result of which he/she has a fundamental human right to control the economic exploitation of his/her work
and to protect its integrity (MMC, 1996: 60). Another difference is that under common law everything is
“transferable”, “assignable”, with total freedom of contract. For example, authors can sign away all their
mechanical rights to their publishers. Civil law legislation ensures that the publisher or producer does not
get everything (Kretschmer et al., 1999).
It is important to acknowledge the different institutional systems among countries when understanding
why different copyright regimes differ in their ways of enforcing IPRs, and why they differ in trade-related
aspects of copyright industries. However, although the countries may differ in ways of organizing music
copyrights at the national level, the way in which they are monitored within industrial structures reflects
greater similarities in ways of capturing and monitoring rent from music rights.- 21 -
The  UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission has found that this monopoly exists in favour of its members
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and is not against the public interest (MMC, 1996: 9).
The  licensing is based upon a pay-for-use principle, which requires that each of every use of each of every
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copyright owners’ work is identified and paid for. The whole complex structure of types of licensing agreements with
types of music users is presented in Taylor and Towse (1998), as well as addressed briefly above in chapter III.
A  leading UK government official recently stressed, in a interview with one of the authors of this paper, the
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costly process of royalty management, and highlighted that one of the two major goals of royalty-collecting societies
in the United K ingdom is cost saving – the other being licensing as much as possibility. He emphasized how new
technology ( especially tracking systems) and ICT can enhance their capabilities in both respects. MCPS and PRS
are the cheapest royalty processors in the world: MCPS only uses 5 per cent of revenue in processing and 95 per
cent for distribution, whereas PRS uses only 10 per cent of revenue in processing and 90 per cent in distribution.
C. Royalty management by the collecting societies
As illustrated above, copyrights provide both the legal and commercial foundations for the music industry.
However, while this regime may underpin the industry, the enforcement of the system of royalty flows
between music users and copyright holders is by no means automatic, but needs to be monitored and
administered through a complex machinery. As it would be far beyond the majority of “copyright holders”
to negotiate and collect their own royalties, royalty-collecting societies have evolved to perform this service.
The first collecting societies emerged in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century and proliferated
in the early decades of the twentieth century. They are essentially non-profit making monopolies  controlled
27
by their members, and whose functions are: (i) to license for specific uses work in which they hold
copyrights;  (ii) to monitor the use of copyrightable material and collect revenue; and (iii) to distribute the
28
revenue as royalties to members of the society.
Collecting societies have evolved, in large part, to reduce the transaction costs arising from the continuous
and complicated task of monitoring and policing copyrights, including abroad.  This means building
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institutional capabilities with respect to knowledge about copyright legislation, as well as about the system
of all music-right holders, music delivery and music users. It also means building technological capacities
to track the flow of copyrightable materials and monitoring royalty payments. Finally, it means establishing
credible legal threats in the event of copyright infringement. But collective agencies can often play a larger
role in the industry, lobbying policy makers on music-related issues, providing information on the business
to their members, promoting musical talent, through scholarships, etc.
However, the structure (i.e. division of labour in managing music rights) of collective societies differ
significantly across countries, in terms of:
• their size, i.e. number of members and affiliates (e.g. publishers), total revenue, number of employees;
• their internal organization (including whether they are public or private bodies), eligibility criteria, the
structure of the board and members’ influence, their methods of monitoring copyright use and their basis
for revenue distribution;
• their external organization, including methods of licensing, structure of tariff agreements, and international
collaboration.- 22 -
See  Andersen and Miles (1999) for a detailed analysis of the role, function, organization and operation of the
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collective societies in the United Kingdom.
International cooperation dates from the 1920s, with the creation of the International Confederation of Societies
31
of Authors and Composers.
In the United Kingdom we find one of the most formalized and disaggregated management of royalties
with several collective societies managing exclusively different music rights (performing, mechanical and
synchronization rights) for different right holders.   Firstly, there is PRS, which represents those who own,
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control or administer the rights in the United Kingdom of public performance (live or recorded), and
broadcasting and cable diffusion of copyright musical compositions (i.e. they administer performing and
synchronization rights for composers, lyricists and songwriters, sometimes through music publishers). The
most important users of licences issued by public performance agencies are radio and TV stations, but they
also include public performance venues (and film companies in the case of synchronization rights).
Secondly, there is MCPS, which as an agent represents those (music-publishing companies or sometimes
music composers) who own, control or administer the mechanical rights in the United Kingdom to reproduce
copyright musical works/master copies. This basically concerns licensing record companies (and sometimes
film companies, as well as radio and TV stations) to manufacture musical works. Recently PRS allied with
MCPS, mainly to broaden their scope of using information and communication technology, and to share and
extend interactive databases (PRS, 1998).
Thirdly, Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) is an agency that represents those who own, control
or administer the performing and broadcasting rights in the United Kingdom of public use of sound
recordings of the record companies. This is mainly a service for record companies, although it also
sometimes includes featured artists or singers, as well as non-featured session players. That is, companies
(and associate) that make sound recordings have legal protection against unauthorized public performance,
broadcasting or cable diffusion of their sound recordings.
Finally, there is a smaller society, Video Performance Limited (VPL), which is an agency that represents
those (mostly record companies) who own, control or administer the rights in the United Kingdom of public
use of copyrights in music videos. That is, companies that make music video recordings have legal protection
against unauthorized public performance, broadcasting or cable diffusion of their music video recordings.
This is not the only model. In other countries, only one society exclusively manages all these rights, such
as JASRAC in Japan and SACEM in France. In the United States, where several societies manage the same
rights non-exclusively (such as, for example, ASCAP and BMI), both managing performing rights together,
with the existence of one society, SESAC, managing several rights. Collecting societies usually have
reciprocal arrangements with other analogous organizations all over the world, in order to capture foreign
payments from sources outside the countries of origin of music.  In particular, international collaboration
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in the external organization of royalty-collection societies is increasing, not only through agreements between
societies but also in direct formal collaboration, collectively monitoring or merging databases. For example,
ASCAP of the United States, Buma/Stemra of the Netherlands and the PRS-MCPS music alliance of the- 23 -
United Kingdom have created an International Music Joint Venture (IMJV) service centre to provide
advantages in the digital age (PRS, 1999). This is only one example of several international initiatives, which,
in addition to improve their services of the societies, also aim to have an impact on standardization issues in
relation to such services.
In most developing countries, collecting societies (and particularly those dealing with mechanical and
synchronization rights) are lacking or very weak. In many cases they are public or semi-public bodies. In
former colonies, collecting societies are often represented by agencies from the former colonial power – such
as the PRS of the United Kingdom, which is still operating in Jamaica in collaboration with its own local
collecting agency (Kozul-Wright and Stanbury, 1998). Jamaica has no mechanical rights-collecting society.
Although collecting in developing countries (such as Jamaica) is due to lagging skills and technologies, there
remains a lack of appreciation among local people (both users of music as well as producers) of the wider
organizing role of the copyright. 
V.   CONCLUSION
Cultural industries, such as music, offer considerable growth and export potential to developing countries.
Not only is the basic resource, musical talent, abundantly available, but regional musical tastes offer
significant opportunities to establish markets for producers in the South. However, talent alone is not
sufficient to build a competitive music industry, and in most developing countries it has suffered from weak
institutional and political support, low levels of entrepreneurial capability, low value-added, over-dependence
on foreign manufacturing and distribution, and massive copyright infringement. Hence, earnings are far below
the potential were the industry more effectively organized. But in industries where ideas and specialized assets
give rise to rents, effective organization requires a variety of specialized institutions. This is particularly true
of music, where the volatility of demand adds to the sizeable risks involved. Indeed, creating a successful
music industry is as much related to institutional capabilities as to music potential or talent.
In this paper we have focused on the role of the copyright and related “neighbouring” rights in providing
a meaningful and important “economic” justification behind most knowledge-intensive products and services
in the audio-visual sector. Without the copyright, the economic reward from original creative work is
threatened and income flows greatly reduced. But the copyright does much more than this: it also helps to
define a market, provides a common focus for complementary specific assets, which are needed to create
a music product, and offers a form of risk sharing.
Even among advanced industrial countries and regions, there are significant differences in their rationales
for IPR protection, which might give some explanation of why they differ in their attitude to trade related
aspects of cultural products, as well as their success in orchestrating intellectual property rights in the music
business with respect to capturing rent. Recognizing this diversity and adapting copyright legislation to local
conditions should be a focus of policy makers in developing countries looking to strengthen their cultural- 24 -
industries. However, the copyright involves much more than legal norms. Monitoring and administering
copyrights highlights the important role of collecting societies as part of a functioning copyright regime. Such
bodies are often central agents standing halfway between the legal and financial systems, and cover both the
national institutional and sectoral aspects of the music industry.
Without the copyright regime, and for all its flaws, a modern music industry is simply not possible, and
unless developing countries develop this system, they will be unable to fully realize the benefits from the
creativity and talents of people in the audio-visual sector. However, given the importance of specialized
assets, the level of market uncertainty for the product and the dominant role played by TNCs in the music
industry, many other policy issues are involved in establishing and consolidating fledgling cultural industries.
In addition, the tendency to cluster geographically music activities raises additional options for policy makers
in developing countries seeking to develop this sector. These issues are the focus of further research.- 25 -
REFERENCES
ALEXANDER P (1994). Entry barriers, release behaviour and multi-product firms in the music recording industry.
Review of Industrial Organizations, 9.
ANDERSEN B and HOWELLS J (1998). Innovation dynamics in services: Intellectual property rights as indicators
and shaping systems in innovation. CRIC Discussion Paper 8, Manchester, UK, University of Manchester.
ANDERSEN B and HOWELLS J (1999). Orchestrating intangibles in the music sector: The royalty collecting
societies in the knowledge based economy. Paper prepared for CRIC-MIT Workshop on Services and
Manufacturing: How do They Differ? Cambridge, MA, 28–29 October.
ANDERSEN B and MILES I (1999). Orchestrating intangibles in the music sector: The royalty collecting societies
in the knowledge-based economy. Paper prepared for CRIC-MIT Workshop on Services and Manufacturing:
How do they differ? Cambridge, MA, 28–29 October.
ARCHIBUGI D (1992). Patenting as an indicator of technological innovation: A review. Science and Public Policy,
19(6): 357–68.
BAINBRIDGE D (1996). Intellectual Property. Third edition. London, Pitman.
BASKERVILLE D (1995). Music Business Handbook and Career Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publishing.
BAUMOL W et al. (1989). Productivity and American Leadership: The Long View. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
BPI (1998). BPI Statistical Handbook 1998. London, British Photographic Industry Limited.
CARAYANNIS EG and ALEXANDER J (1999). The wealth of knowledge, converting intellectual property to
intellectual capital in cooperative research and technology management settings.  International Journal o f
Technology Management, 18: 3–4.
CHEUNG SNS (1986). Property rights and invention. In: Palmer J, ed. Research in Law and Economics: The
Economics of Patents and Copyrights, 8: 5–18.
DALEY W (1999). Remarks made during WIPO Conference on Electronic Commerce and Intellectual Property,
Geneva, 14 September.
DAVID P (1992). Knowledge, property and the systems dynamic of technical changes. Proceedings of the World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington, DC, World Bank.
FINK M (1989). Inside the Music Business. New York, Schirmer Books.
GALPERIN H (1999). Cultural industries policy in regional trade agreements: the cases of NAFTA, the European
Union and MERCOSUR. Media, Culture and Society, 21: 627–648.
IFPI (various years). Statistical Handbook. London,International Federation of the Phonographic Industry.
JAPAN PATENT OFFICE (1999). International Circumstances on Industrial Property Rights (IPRs). November.
Website: http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp/tousie/chapter1.htm.
JEHORAM HC (1989). Critical reflections on the economic importance of copyright. VCH, Verlagsgesellschaft mbH,
4. Winheim, Germany.
KOKKA SS (1998). Property rights on an intranet.  Journal of Technology Law and Policy, 3(1). Website:
http://journal.law.ufl.edu/~techlaw/3–2/kokka.html.- 26 -
KOZUL-WRIGHT Z (1995). Innovation and industrial organisation (PhD thesis). Cambridge, UK, University of
Cambridge.
KOZUL-WRIGHT Z and STANBURY L (1998). Becoming a globally competitive player: The case of the music
industry in Jamaica. UNCTAD Discussion Paper 138. Geneva, United Nations, October.
KRETSCHMER M, KLIMIS GM and WALLIS R (1999). The changing location of intellectual property rights in
music: A study of music publishers, collection societies and media conglomerates. Prometheus, 17(2).
KRUGMAN P (1994). Geography and Trade. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
LANDES WM and POSNER R (1989). An economic analysis of copyright law. Journal of Legal Studies, XVIII, June.
MARSHALL A (1919). Industry and Trade. First edition. London, Macmillan.
MARSHALL A (1952). Principles of Economics. Eighth edition. London, Macmillian.
MMC (1996). Performing Rights: A Report on the Supply in the UK of the Services of Administering Performing
Rights and Film Synchronisation Rights. London, HMSO, Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
NOBLE DF (1979). American by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism. New York,
Alfred A Knopf.
OECD (1996). The Knowledge Based Economy. Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
PRS (1998). Music industry combines to develop world’s most advanced music database. PRS News Archive. UK,
Performing Right Society, 8 January.
PRS (1999). World rights societies announce landmark joint venture. Performing Right Society, PRS Press Release,
17 March.
RIAA (various years). Annual Reports. Washington, DC, Recording Industry Association of America.
RICARDO D (1981). On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University
Press.
ROMER P (1992). True strategies for economic development – Using ideas and producing ideas. In: Proceedings
of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington, DC, World Bank.
ROWTHORN R (1992). US productivity growth and economic leadership. Review of Income and Wealth, December.
ROWTHORN R (1999). Where are the advanced economies going? In: Hodgson G et al., eds. Capitalism and
Evolution. Cheltenam, UK, Edward Elgar.
SILBERSTON A (1998). The economic importance of copyright. Paper presented at Conference on Creativity and
Intellectual Property Rights: Evolving Scenarios and Perspectives, Vienna, 12–14 July.
SMITH A (1937). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York, Modern Library.
STORPER M and SORENSON C (1987). Flexible specialization and regional industrial agglomerations: The case of
the U.S. motion picture industry. Annals of the American Geographers, 77(1).
SULLIVAN RJ (1989). England’s ‘age of invention’: The acceleration of patents and patentable invention during the
industrial revolution. Explorations in Economic History, 26: 424–452.
TAYLOR M and TOWSE R (1998). The value of performers’ rights: An economic approach. Media, Culture and
Society, 20: 631–652.
THURROW L (1999). Building Wealth. New York, Harper Collins.- 27 -
TOWSE R (1992). The earnings of singers: An economic analysis. In: Towse R and Khakee A, eds. Cultural
Economics. Berlin, Springer-Verlag.
TOWSE R, ed. (1997). Baumol’s Cost Disease, The Arts and Other Victims. Cheltenham UK, Edward Elgar.
TOWSE R ed. (1999). Copyright and economic incentives: An application to performers’ rights in the music industry.
Kyklos, 52.
UNCTAD (1999). Jamaica: The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Review. New York and Geneva, United
Nations.
USCO (1998). Copyright registration of musical compositions and sound recordings. Circular 56a. Washington, DC,
US Library of Congress, United States Copyright Office, September.
VOGEL H (1998). Entertainment Industry Economics. Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.
WILLIAMSON OE (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, Free Press.
WIPO (1987). Intellectual Property and Computers. WO/INF/11, Geneva, World Intellectual Property Organization.
WIPO (1999). Industrial Property and Copyright Administration Directories. Geneva, World Intellectual Property
Organization, November. Website: http://www.wipo.org/eng/main.htm.- 28 -
UNCTAD Discussion Papers
No. 54,  January 1993 Trevor GARDNER The present economic situation in Zambia and
the  role of privatisation in improving its
economy
No. 55,  February 1993 Alexandre R. BARROS Prospects for world sugar trade
No. 56,  March 1993 Yilmaz AKYÜZ Financial liberalization:  The key issues
No. 57,  April 1993 Alice H. AMSDEN Structural macroeconomic underpinnings o f
effective industrial policy:  Fast growth in the
1980s in five Asian countries
No. 58,  April 1993 Celso ALMEIDA Development and transfer of environmentally
sound technologies in manufacturing:  A survey
No. 59,  May 1993 Ali-Reza NIKPAY Privatization in Eastern Europe:  A survey of the
main issues
No. 60,  July 1993 Jean-Marc FONTAINE Reforming public enterprises and the public
sector in sub-Saharan Africa
No. 61,  July 1993 Korkut BORATAV Public sector, public intervention and economic
development
No. 62,  July 1993 Roberto FRENKEL Growth and structural reform in Latin America:
Where we stand
No  63,  July 1993 Machiko NISSANKE & Mobilization and allocation of domestic savings:
Priya BASU A study on Bhutan
No. 64,  July 1993 Machiko NISSANKE & Mobilization and allocation of domestic savings
Priya BASU A case study on Nepal
No. 65,  August 1993 Ercan UYGUR Liberalization and economic performance i n
Turkey
No. 66,  August 1993 Yilmaz AKYÜZ Maastricht and fiscal retrenchment in Europe
No. 67,  September 1993 Cem SOMEL The  State in economic activity:  Problems of
economic policy-making
No. 68,  September 1993 Andrew CORNFORD The role of the Basle Committee on Banking
Super- vision in the regulation of international
banking
No. 69,  September 1993 Sebastian SCHICH The level and volatility of external financial posi-
tions and the costs of export credit insurance
No. 70,  October 1993 Veena JHA, Ecolabelling and international trade
René VOSSENAAR &
Simonetta ZARRILLI
No. 71,  October 1993 Adolfo CANITROT The exchange rate as an instrument of trade policy
No. 72,  October 1993 Xiaoning J. ZHAN North American economic integration and its
implications for the exports of China and Hong
Kong
No. 73,  November 1993 J.H. REICHMAN Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for
developing countries as competitors in an inte-
grated world market
No. 74,  November 1993 Priya BASU & Fiscal adjustment in the Gambia:  A case study
Norman GEMMELL
No. 75,  November 1993 William W.F. CHOA The relevance of market structure to technologi-
cal  progress: A case study of the chemical
industry
No. 76,  December 1993 Ajit SINGH The Plan, the market and evolutionary economic
reform in China
No. 77,  January 1994 Shigehisa KASAHARA A rescue plan for the post-bubble Japanese
economy: The establishment of the Cooperative
Credit Purchasing Company
No. 78,  January 1994 Jean K. THISEN The European Single Market and its possible
effects on African external trade- 29 -
No. 79,  February 1994 Kálmán KALOTAY & Emerging stock markets and the scope for regional
Ana María ALVAREZ cooperation
No. 80,  February 1994 Edouard DOMMEN Développement durable:  Mots-déclic
No. 81,* March 1994 Juan A. DE CASTRO The internalization of external environmental
costs and sustainable development
No. 82:  WITHDRAWN
No. 83,  May 1994 Yilmaz AKYÜZ & Regimes for international capital movements and
Andrew CORNFORD some proposals for reform
No. 84,  May 1994 David FELIX Industrial development in East Asia:  What are
the lessons for Latin America?
No. 85,  July 1994 S.M. SHAFAEDDIN The impact of trade liberalization on export and
GDP growth in least developed countries
No. 86,  July 1994 Raju J. SINGH Bank credit, small firms and the design of  a
financial system for Eastern Europe
No. 87,  July 1994 Thomas ZIESEMER Economic development and endogenous terms-
of-trade determination: Review and reinter-
pretation of the Presbisch-Singer Thesis
No. 88,  August 1994 Sebastian SCHICH The payment arrangements in the trade of CEECs
and LDCs between 1986 and 1994
No. 89,* September 1994 Veena JHA & Are environmentally sound technologies the
Ana Paola TEIXEIRA Emperor’s new clothes?
No. 90,  October 1994 Manuel R. AGOSIN Saving and investment in Latin America
No. 91,  October 1994 Yilmaz AKYÜZ & The investment-profits nexus in East Asian
Charles GORE industrialization
No. 92,  November 1994 Charles GORE Development strategy in East Asian newly
industrializing economies:  The experience of
post-war Japan, 1953-1973
No. 93,  December 1994 J. F. OUTREVILLE Life insurance in developing countries: A cross-
country analysis
No. 94,  January 1995 XIE Ping Financial services in China
No. 95,  January 1995 William W.F. CHOA The derivation of trade matrices by commodity
groups in current and constant prices
No. 96,  February 1995 Alexandre R. BARROS The role of wage stickiness in economic growth
No. 97,  February 1995 Ajit SINGH How did East Asia grow so fast? Slow progress
towards an analytical consensus
No. 98,  April 1995 Z. KOZUL-WRIGHT The role of the firm in the innovation process
No. 99,  May 1995 Juan A. DE CASTRO Trade and labour standards: Using the wrong
instruments for the right cause
No. 100,  August 1995 Roberto FRENKEL Macroeconomic sustainability and develop-ment
prospects: Latin American performance in the
1990s
No. 101,  August 1995 R. KOZUL-WRIGHT Walking on two legs:  Strengthening democracy
& Paul RAYMENT and productive entrepreneurship in the
transition economies
No. 102,  August 1995 J.C. DE SOUZA BRAGA Financing the public sector in Latin America
M.A. MACEDO CINTRA
& Sulamis DAIN
No. 103,  September 1995 Toni HANIOTIS & Should governments subsidize exports through
Sebastian SCHICH export credit insurance agencies?
No. 104,  September 1995 Robert ROWTHORN A simulation model of North-South trade
No. 105,  October 1995 Giovanni N. DE VITO Market distortions and competition: the particu-
lar case of Malaysia
No. 106,  October 1995 John EATWELL Disguised unemployment: The G7 experience
No. 107,  November 1995 Luisa E. SABATER Multilateral debt of least developed countries
No. 108,  November 1995 David FELIX Financial globalization versus free trade: The
case for the Tobin tax
No. 109,  December 1995 Urvashi ZUTSHI Aspects of the final outcome of the negotiations
on financial services of the Uruguay Round- 30 -
No. 110,  January 1996 H.A.C. PRASAD Bilateral terms of trade of selected countries from
the South with the North and the South
No. 111,  January 1996 Charles GORE Methodological nationalism and the misunder-
standing of East Asian industrialization
No. 112,  March 1996 Djidiack FAYE Aide publique au développement et dette
extérieure:  Quelles mesures opportunes pour le
financement du secteur privé en Afrique?
No. 113,  March 1996 Paul BAIROCH & Globalization myths:  Some historical reflections
Richard KOZUL-WRIGHT on integration, industrialization and growth in
the world economy
No. 114,  April 1996 Rameshwar TANDON Japanese financial deregulation since 1984
No. 115,  April 1996 E.V.K. FITZGERALD Intervention versus regulation:  The role of the
IMF in crisis prevention and management
No. 116,  June 1996 Jussi LANKOSKI Controlling agricultural nonpoint source pollu-
tion: The case of mineral balances
No. 117,  August 1996 José RIPOLL Domestic insurance markets in developing coun-
tries:  Is there any life after GATS?
No. 118,  September 1996 Sunanda SEN Growth centres in South East Asia in the era of
globalization
No. 119,  September 1996 Leena ALANEN The impact of environmental cost inter-nalization
on sectoral competitiveness: A new conceptual
framework
No. 120,  October 1996 Sinan AL-SHABIBI Structural adjustment for the transition to dis-
armament: An assessment of the role of the
market
No. 121,  October 1996 J.F. OUTREVILLE Reinsurance in developing countries: Market
structure and comparative advantage
No. 122,  December 1996 Jörg MAYER Implications of new trade and endogenous
growth theories for diversification policies o f
commodity-dependent countries
No. 123,  December 1996 L. RUTTEN & Collateralized commodity financing with special
L. SANTANA-BOADO reference to the use of warehouse receipts
No. 124,  March 1997 Jörg MAYER Is h aving a rich natural-resource endowment
detrimental to export diversification?
No. 125,  April 1997 Brigitte BOCOUM The new mining legislation of Côte d’Ivoire:
Some comparative features
No. 126,* April 1997 Jussi LANKOSKI Environmental effects of agricultural trade lib-
eralization and domestic agricultural policy
reforms
No. 127,  May 1997 Raju Jan SINGH Banks, growth and geography
No. 128,  September 1997 E. COSIO-PASCAL Debt sustainability and social and human devel-
opment:  The net transfer approach and a com-
ment  on the so-called “net” present value
calculation for debt relief
No. 129, September 1997 Andrew J. CORNFORD Selected features of financial sectors in Asia and
their implications for services trade
No. 130,  March 1998 Matti VAINIO The effect of unclear property rights on environ-
mental degradation and increase in poverty
No. 131,  Feb./March 1998 Robert ROWTHORN & Globalization and economic convergence:  An
Richard KOZUL-WRIGHT assessment
No. 132,  March 1998 Martin BROWNBRIDGE The causes of financial distress in local banks in
Africa and implications for prudential policy
No. 133,  March 1998 Rubens LOPES BRAGA Expanding developing countries’ exports in  a
global economy:  The need to emulate the stra-
tegies used by transnational corporations for
international business development
No. 134,  April 1998 A.V. GANESAN Strategic options available to developing coun-
tries with regard to a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment- 31 -
No. 135,  May 1998 Jene K. KWON The East Asian model:  An exploration of rapid
economic growth in the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan Province of China
No. 136,  June 1998 JOMO K.S. & M. ROCK Economic diversification and primary commodity
processing in the second-tier South-East Asian
newly industrializing countries
No. 137,  June 1998 Rajah RASIAH The export manufacturing experience o f
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand:  Lessons for
Africa
No. 138,  October 1998 Z. KOZUL-WRIGHT & Becoming a globally competitive player: The case
Lloyds STANBURY of the music industry in Jamaica
No. 139,  December 1998 Mehdi SHAFAEDDIN How did Developed Countries Industrialize?
The History of Trade and Industrial Policy:  The
Cases of Great Britain and the USA
No. 140,  February 1999 M. BRANCHI, Traditional agricultural exports, external 
G. GABRIELE & dependency and domestic prices policies:
V. SPIEZIA African coffee exports in a comparative
perspective
No. 141,  May 1999 Lorenza JACHIA & Free trade between South Africa and the European
Ethél TELJEUR Union – A quantitative analysis
No. 142,  November 1999 J. François OUTREVILLE Financial development, human capital and
political stability
No. 143, November 1999 Yilmaz AKYÜZ & Capital flows to developing countries and the
Andrew CORNFORD  reform of the international financial system
No. 144, December 1999 Wei GE The dynamics of export-processing zones
**********
Copies  of UNCTAD Discussion Papers and Reprint Series may be obtained from the Editorial Assistant,
Macroeconomic and Development Policies, GDS, UNCTAD, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland
(Tel. 41-22-907.5733; Fax 41-22-907.0274; E.mail: nicole.winch@unctad.org).
               
*     Out of stock.